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Abstract
By focusing on the emergence of an Islamist elite in Algeria this paper identifies the
conditions under which co-optation processes stabilize authoritarian regimes. It first provides
an empirical assessment on the presence of MSP-Hamas elite in state institutions, which
reveals that their co-optation is symbolic in terms of power sharing. This in turn brings about
the question of what were the expectations of the actors involved in the co-optation process.
While MSP-Hamas leaders expected to strengthen their party in order to take over power, it
appears that they failed in their attempts to gain more influence in the decision-making
process. Our analysis shows that it is the very conditions under which this elite was co-opted
that precluded it to undermine authoritarian incumbents’ hold on power.
1Co-optation, Repression and Authoritarian Regime’s Survival:
The Case of the Islamist MSP-Hamas in Algeria∗
Noura Hamladji
European University Institute, Florence
This paper provides an analysis of the emergence of a new elite in an authoritarian regime.
In a seminal contribution to the study of authoritarian regimes, Juan Linz provides a path-
breaking definition of such a regime (Linz 1970: 255). According to Linz, an authoritarian
regime has four characteristics that differentiate it from a democratic or totalitarian regime: a
limited not responsible pluralism, no ideology, neither intensive nor extensive mobilization,
and a leader or a small group which exercises power within formally ill-defined limits.
Concerning one of these characteristics, limited pluralism, he states:
In authoritarian regimes the men who come to power reflecting the views of various groups and
institutions do not derive their position from the support of these groups alone, but from the trust
placed in them by the leader, monarch or "junta," who certainly takes into account their prestige and
influence. They have a kind of constituency, but this is not solely or even principally the source of their
power.
The co-optation of leaders is a constant process by which different sectors or institutions become
participants in the system (Linz 1970: 257).
According to this author, the emergence of a new elite in an authoritarian regime is
intrinsically linked with its limited pluralism. By including new leaders on the one hand, and
repressing the illegal opposition on the other, the constant processes of co-optation and
repression contribute to the durability of the authoritarian system. Yet the mechanisms by
which co-optation of leaders stabilizes the political regime, instead of destabilizing it, remain
unclear. Linz does not address the many alternative possibilities of change that the process of
co-optation allows for and seems to assume ex post that such a process is a successful
mechanism, that is a mechanism of survival of authoritarian regimes.
In my view, combining co-optation with repression is not necessarily a stabilizing strategy
that allows the authoritarian incumbents to keep their hold on power. In order to reach a better
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2understanding of authoritarian regimes, we thus need to make a step further and identify the
conditions under which a process of co-optation works as a stabilizing mechanism of
authoritarian regimes. For this purpose, the paper will examine in detail a specific case: the
emergence of an Islamist elite in Algeria, namely the elite of the MSP-Hamas party.
Political change has affected Algeria since 1988. In October 1988, popular riots have
precipitated the authoritarian regime into taking steps towards liberalization and, to a lesser
extent, towards democratization. Following this opening, more than sixty parties were
legalized. The Movement for an Islamic Society (Harakat al-Mujtama’ al-Islami, HAMAS)1
was founded on December 11, 1990 by Mahfoud Nahnah and was legally recognized on 29
April 1991. MSP-Hamas is the political wing of the non-political association al-Irshad wal-
Islah (Orientation and Reform) founded in 1988 and legally recognized in 1989. Mahfoud
Nahnah, president of al-Irshad wal-Islah, decided to create a political party after the sweeping
victory of the FIS (Islamic Front for Salvation) in the local elections of 1990. His party
participated to the first round of legislative elections in December 1991 that ended in victory
for the FIS. This victory was followed by the cancellation of the second round of the elections
and the army putsch in January 1992. Since this event, Algeria has experienced a wave of
escalating violence throughout the country. The violence of the various Islamic armed groups
is met by repression from the Algerian armed forces. The country has been driven into a more
and more savage civil war. While violence has notably diminished since the truce declared by
the AIS (Islamic Army for Salvation) on September 21, 19972 and the implementation of the
"civilian concord"3, the number of deaths since 1992 is officially estimated to have been in
excess of 100.000. It is in this context of civil war that an MSP-Hamas elite emerged in
Algerian State institutions.
                                                 
1 This party was named Hamas until 1997. Following a new party law in 1997 (see Enactment n°97-09 of 6
March 1997 "portant loi organique relative aux partis politiques." JORA n°12 of 6 March 1997, p24-28), Hamas
changed its name to the Movement of Society for Peace, MSP (Harakat al-Mujtama’ lil-Silm, HAMAS). In this
paper, this party is called MSP-Hamas regardless of the period concerned.
2 In an official statement dated on September  21, 1997 and published by the newspapers  on September 24,1997,
Madani Merzag, emir of the AIS, called for a truce.
3 In 1999, the newly elected president Bouteflika launched the project of a "civilian concord law" in order to
pacify the country.  In July 1999, this law was successively ratified by the National Popular Assembly, the
Council of the Nation, and, in the referendum of September 16, 1999, by the Algerian electors. This law
guaranteed to all “terrorists” who wished to surrender before the ultimatum of 13 January 2000 an amnesty for
those who did not commit "bloody" crimes, and extenuating circumstances for those who did. On January 11,
2000, Bouteflika issued a decree of free pardon for the AIS elements (between 1000 and 2000 combatants). The
day after, the AIS declared its dissolution. Except from the AIS, all the islamist armed groups reject the "civilian
concord" (GIA: Islamist armed groups, LIDD: Islamist league for da’wa and jihad, and GSPC: Salafist group for
preaching and fight). This fact explains why, despite the "civilian law," violence persists. in Algeria, although to
a lesser degree (from the ultimatum date of 13th January 2000 to June 2000, Algerian newpapers estimated there
were around 1000 deaths).
3The paper is organized as follows. It first provides an empirical assessment, grounded
upon selected data, on the presence of MSP-Hamas elite in state institutions. It shows that the
co-optation of this elite is symbolic in terms of power sharing, which in turn brings the
question of what were the expectations of the actors involved in such symbolic co-optation. It
is suggested that, by co-opting MSP-Hamas leaders, military incumbents expected to appease
part of the FIS electorate. As regards MSP-Hamas leaders, the evidence gathered indicates
clearly that they expected to strengthen their party in order to take over power, but failed in
their attempts to gain more influence in the decision-making process. Their participation
strategy has allowed them to go only half the way towards power. In order to understand the
deadlock that the MSP-Hamas has reached, it is argued that it is the very conditions under
which this elite was co-opted that precluded it to undermine authoritarian incumbents’ hold
on power.
I. Assessing the emergence of MSP-Hamas elite
The emergence of an MSP-Hamas elite in State institutions has been a gradual process
that began in the aftermath of the military coup of January 1992. This section will empirically
assess the presence of an MSP-Hamas elite in the following Algerian institutions: the
government, the parliament (assembly and upper chamber), and the local assemblies (APC
and APW).
I.1. Government
The emergence of MSP-Hamas elite can be traced back to the second Ghozali cabinet of
1992. A member of the association Irshad wal Islah was nominated minister of religious
affairs during this cabinet (see Table 1). Although this leader was not a member of the MSP-
Hamas party, the association’s close link with this party allows such a conclusion to be
drawn.
Table 1 shows that MSP-Hamas members were first nominated in the Ouyahia cabinet, in
which they had two portfolios, in the aftermath of the presidential elections of 1995. The fact
that the leader of MSP-Hamas, Mahfoud Nahnah, took second place in this election with
25,58% of the vote seems to justify the entry of this party into a governmental coalition. The
presence of MSP-Hamas members in the government peaked in 1997 when to the party were
given seven portfolios following the legislative elections that year. The vote obtained by this
party in the elections (1.533.185 votes and 69 seats) strengthened its position both in the
second Ouyahia cabinet and in the Hamdani cabinet. However, the rejection by the
4Constitutional Council of Mahfoud Nahnah’s candidacy for the anticipated presidential
election4 marked a backward step for the party. Prevented from standing in the presidential
elections, Mahfoud Nahnah decided to support the candidacy of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who
eventually won. Bouteflika rewarded MSP-Hamas by allocating the party three portfolios.
[TABLE 1]
Table 1 also shows that the portfolios allocated by the president to MSP-Hamas have been
of secondary importance. Portfolios of the Interior, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance,
and Commerce have always been reserved either to the military (the portfolio of Defense is
usually reserved for the military) or to technocrats and members of the RND and FLN, who
are loyal to the military incumbents. It follows that the co-optation of an MSP-Hamas elite in
the executive did not drastically change the main orientation of the Algerian executive.
Economic, social and political goals have been defined and implemented by authoritarian
incumbents independently of the Hamas-MSP elite’s political opinions and positions.
I.2. Assemblies
The entrance of MSP-Hamas members to the Algerian parliament dates back to 1994 (see
Table 2). In an attempt to legalize State institutions after the military coup of 1992, military
incumbents organized a National Conference on January 25 and 26, 1994 inviting all political
parties. However, the fact that the major political parties boycotted the conferenve deprived it
of all legitimacy. Nevertheless, the non-representative members of the National Conference
adopted a “platform of national consensus” in which the power of the three institutions of
transition, i.e. the Presidency of the State, the government and the National Council of
Transition (CNT), were specified. The CNT was defined as a legislative chamber controlled
by the executive branch of power and its members were to be nominated by the President of
the state. The latter, the general Liamine Zeroual, was himself nominated by the High security
council, a non-representative state institution, on January 30, 1994. Despite both the non-
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5legitimate character of the CNT and its control by the executive, the MSP-Hamas agreed to
participate in this institution and five members of the MSP-Hamas were nominated as
members of the CNT. This participation marks both the first entry of the MSP-Hamas elite in
a State institution and the first act of moucharaka (participation) by this party. From this point
on, regardless of the power acquired, the MSP-Hamas has followed a moucharaka strategy,
the main goal of which is to place its elite in as many state institutions as possible.
Following this strategy, the MSP-Hamas participated in the legislative elections of June 5,
1997, the local and wilayal (departmental) elections of October 23, 1997, and the indirect
elections for the upper chamber of December 25, 1997. Despite the vehement accusations
made by opposition parties, including MSP-Hamas, of the unfair character of all these
elections, all the opposition parties accepted their seats in Parliament and in the Popular
Assembly of Communes (APC) and Wilayas (APW). Table 2 shows that MSP-Hamas
obtained a rather good result at the legislative elections of 1997, gaining 69 seats out of 380 in
the National Popular Assembly (APN). However, its score at the local and wilayal elections
of the same year was rather modest: 924 seats out of 13.123 for the APC elections, and 265
seats out of 1880 for the APW elections. The score for the indirect election of December 1997
for the upper chamber was even more modest with only 2 senators elected out of 96 and no
senator nominated out of 48. This tendency was confirmed in 2001 when half the upper
chamber was renewed with MSP-Hamas having only 3 senators elected and no senator
nominated.
[TABLE 2]
These unequal results can be explained by inequalities in power that the different State
institutions wield. The legislative power of the popular assembly APN, where the MSP-
Hamas elite is numerous, is limited by the veto power of the upper chamber (the Nation
Council). In the latter, the proportion of MSP-Hamas elite members is much lower, giving
MSP-Hamas very limited legislative power. As for the APC and APW, while these have the
advantage of relative autonomy at the local level, control over these bodies has mostly been
bestowed via unfair elections to the parties loyal to the military incumbents, namely, RND
and FLN. Consequently, it can be observed that the more an institution is powerless, the
greater representation the MSP-Hamas has within it. The unfair character of all these
                                                                                                                                                         
charge of assessing the proofs presented by each candidate and giving the status of moudjahid. This status was
refused to Mahfoud Nahnah and his candidacy was thus rejected by the Constitutional Council.
6elections, a fact which allows the military incumbents to control the distribution of the seats,
confirms this hypothesis. In other words, these elections are nothing more than a mechanism
of co-opting elites.
In conclusion, although we can observe the emergence of an MSP-Hamas elite in state
institutions, this emergence only corresponds to a marginal access to power for this elite. The
previous discussion clearly suggests that both in the case of the successive governments and
for the assemblies, access to state institutions is controlled by the military incumbents.
Moreover, this co-optation is characterized by a high number of MSP-Hamas elite members
in powerless institutions. Thus, is it possible to conclude that the co-optation of an MSP-
Hamas elite in State institutions is marginal in terms of sharing power? If it is not access to
power that drove the actors to accept this mechanism of co-optation, what were each party’s
expectations both in co-opting and accepting co-optation? These questions will be addressed
in the next section.
II. The expectations evolution of actors involved in the co-optation process
This section illustrates another aspect of the process of co-optation, the expectations of the
actors involved in it. It can be assumed that actors’ expectations are not fixed, but change over
time according to the political context. Therefore, it is the evolution of the expectations of
both the co-opters and the co-opted that are analyzed in this section.
II.1. The co-opters’ expectations: the benefits of co-opting a “moderate”
Islamist party
According to Luis Martinez, Algeria has been experiencing a civil war since 1992
(Martinez 1998a). This author argues that what informs the behavior of actors is a common
imaginative frame of reference in which war is a mode of social promotion. According to his
view, “war is a mode of accumulation of wealth and prestige and is for this reason continually
reactualized by the local actors” (Martinez 1998: 26). Moreover, he traces this imaginative
frame of war (imaginaire de guerre) back to the Ottoman period. From the Algiers Regency
in the sixteenth century up to the current civil war, a series of “political bandits” from modest
social origins have practiced war as a mode of climbing the social ladder and at the same time
marked the imaginative frame of local actors by becoming historical models of success. These
emblematic figures have provided such a model: the Corsairs, who practiced piracy in the
Mediterranean sea in the pre-colonial era; the Caïds, tribal leaders co-opted by the French
7colonial authorities; the Colonels, fighters of the Algerian liberation army during the war of
independence; and finally the Emirs, fighters of the Islamist armed groups in the current civil
war (Martinez 1998a: 26-32). In this perspective, war and violence in Algeria are an
economic and political choice made by some actors because they expect from it an
accumulation of resources. This line of thought leads Martinez to argue that none of the
protagonists of the current civil war, i.e. the Algerian military and the Islamist armed groups,
is likely to win. A more likely outcome would rather be the fusion of the protagonists by “the
progressive assimilation of Islamist maquisards in the wheels of State, in line with the
reinvention of the beylicat model” (Martinez 1998a: 377). In short, since the sixteenth
century, war has been the mechanism not only of promotion to the status of leader, but also of
access to State institutions via a co-optation process.
There are two main criticisms that could be levelled against Martinez’s thesis. First,
although Martinez is careful to deny that Algerian society is a society of warriors (Martinez
1998a: 34), he nevertheless affirms the exact opposite when stating that war is the mode of
social promotion in the imaginative frame of Algerians. It is thus difficult to ignore the
cultural-essentialist side of such an argument, which led Hugh Roberts to conclude that
“Martinez thesis boils down to a reformulation, within the trappings of academic
sophistication, of that very old, and unmistakably cultural-essentialist, idea, to which the pieds
noirs were so viscerally attached, that les Arabes are cut-throats” (Roberts 1999: 389).
Second, resorting to the notion of an operative “imaginative frame of war,” through which
actors interpret war as an advantageous political and economic choice, is a rather simplistic
way of understanding the modes of access to state power in Algeria since the sixteenth
century. It ignores the complexities of the Algerian Ottoman period, the colonization period,
the war of independence and the current civil war. Although to comment in detail on the
history of each of these periods would require a discussion too long to be included in this
paper, it is at least important to recall that each was characterized by diverse and complex
mechanisms of co-optation and social promotion that cannot merely be reduced to the practice
of violence and war. In this respect, the current civil war is a good example, for not only has
its evolution contradicted Martinez’s hypothesis but it has also been characterized by another
mode of elite co-optation that Martinez neglects. It appears that since the unilateral and
unconditional truce declared by the AIS (Islamic Army for Salvation) on  September 21, 1997
and the implementation in January 2000 of the "civilian concord," launched by the newly
elected president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, both the Islamist fighters of the AIS and the FIS
political leaders in exile have been kept outside the wheels of the Algerian State. Although
8Luis Martinez has interpreted each of these events in his most recent writings as eventual
steps toward the absorption of Islamist maquisards in State institutions (Martinez 1997,
1998b, and 2000), it clearly appears that such a process is yet to occurr. For the moment, the
war has not produced a fusion of its protagonists. On the contrary, the Algerian military
seems to have been able to reduce violence to a non-threatening degree without any sort of
political concession to or co-optation of Islamist fighters. Yet the military elite has resorted to
the co-optation of another Islamist elite which has rejected violence, namely the MSP-Hamas
elite. What could explain this process? What are the military incumbents expecting from the
co-optation of the MSP-Hamas leaders?
No available data exist on the diverse expectations of military incumbents regarding this
issue. Interesting and relevant information was gathered during interviews with a number of
MSP-Hamas leaders, which was carried during my own field research and which will be
discussed in the next section. However, interviewing military incumbents can be a difficult
and dangerous task. The only way to overcome this restriction is to resort to indirect data, an
approach that we adopt below.
As was shown in the previous section, the co-optation of the MSP-Hamas elite in State
institutions by military incumbents has been irregular. Indeed, the co-optation process has
varied mainly along two dimensions. First, it has varied over time: the process began in 1994
with the National Council of Transition (CNT), reached a peak in 1997 with the election of 69
MSP-Hamas deputies to the assembly (APN) and the allocation of 7 government portfolios to
MSP-Hamas members, and then diminished with the attribution of just 3 portfolios in the
Algerian cabinet since 1999. Second, it has varied according to the nature of the state
institutions to which MSP-Hamas members have been appointed: even during the peak period
of co-optation, the number of MSP-Hamas members was high in powerless institutions such
as the assembly and very low in institutions involved in decision making, such as the
government and the Nation Council. It can thus be deduced that the military incumbents were
most interested in co-opting MSP-Hamas elite between 1997 and 1999 and only in powerless
state positions.
Why was there such an interest in co-opting MSP-Hamas leaders in powerless state
institutions and particularly during the period between 1997 and 1999? An obvious answer to
the first part of the question would be that the military incumbents had no intention of sharing
power with an Islamist elite. As to the second part of the question, i.e. the timing, the
relationship between the Algerian military and the other Islamist groups provides us with a
9clue. Immediately after 1992, it was difficult to identify any eventual winner of the war
between the army and Islamist armed groups, such as AIS and GIA. Yet by 1995, it was clear
that Islamist groups would be unable to take control of the State. This realisation led in
September 1997 to a unilateral and unconditional truce by the AIS, and in 1999 this was
followed by the launch of the "civilian concord" by the newly elected president, Abdelaziz
Bouteflika, marking a definitive retreat from violence. Although several Islamist groups, such
as the GIA, the MEI (Movement for an Islamic State) and the FIDA (the Islamic Front of
Jihad), rejected the civilian concord and continued the jihad, the army was finally able to
reduce the level of violence to a “residual level.”5 As regard the political leaders of the FIS,
the army incumbents first attempted to negotiate with them between 1993 and 1995, but in
1996 finally excluded them from the legal political game.
These events have led some observers to argue that the army incumbents are divided
between advocates of an eradication of Islamist groups (“eradicators”) and advocates of
negotiation with Islamist leaders (“negotiators”). Although never tested by an empirical study
on the Algerian army, this hypothesis seems plausible. Yet what is of interest for our puzzle is
to relate these events with the parallel process of co-optation of another Islamist group,
namely the MSP-Hamas. In this connection, it appears that the peak of co-optation of MSP-
Hamas leaders between 1997 and 1999 corresponds to the period when the negotiation
attempts with FIS leaders had been abandoned, and when the military showed their
supremacy over the armed Islamist groups while at the same time failing to reduce the level of
violence in the field. The military incumbents therefore co-opted a collaborationist Islamist
group, MSP-Hamas, as a way of appeasing part of the FIS’s social base and dissuading it
from joining the Islamist guerrilla movement. This strategy appeared to pay off as long as
armed Islamist groups maintained a high level of violence in the field. However, from 1999
on, once the military’s grasp on the state appeared consolidated and the violence was
considerably reduced, co-optation of MSP-Hamas leaders was no longer advantageous for the
military incumbents.
It could be that these variations are due to the pre-eminence at the head of the military
hierarchy of negotiators or eradicators at different points in time. However, what is of interest
for our analysis is that military incumbents, whether negotiators or eradicators, by co-opting
MSP-Hamas leaders, expected to appease part of the FIS electorate in order both to
                                                 
5 Although Algeria was experiencing an extreme and savage civil war culminating with massacres of hundreds
of civilians in August and September 1997, army propaganda affirmed that since 1995 that “terrorism had been
reduced to a residual level.” In reality, the level of violence considerably diminished only from 1998.
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consolidate its power and to reduce violence to a “residual level.” Once this objective was
fulfilled, this process of co-optation appeared less attractive and thus diminished without,
however, being totally abandoned.
II.2. The co-opteds’ expectations: maximizing the moucharaka (participation)
The MSP-Hamas elite has always rejected a confrontation with the army. It was a direct
competitor of the FIS and defended a moderate interpretation of Islam that accepts democracy
and female labor (Al-Ahnaf and al; 1991: 37-42). Its strategy since the military coup in
January 1992 has not changed. The party names it the strategy of moucharaka. It consists of
rejecting the recourse to violence in order to gain power, and of instead advocating
collaboration with the military incumbents. One representative of Hamas explains this
strategy as follows: “Hamas has always advocated the alternative of participation, this is a
moderate alternative. In 1989, people were thinking that the Islamic movement was a whole.
While the FIS was the first Islamist party in Algeria, we understood right from the beginning
that it couldn’t last as a party. We were right because it has given itself over to terrorism. Our
party is not terrorist and we have faced the savage violence of terrorism since 1992. We have
always rejected violence and for this reason some of our militants and leaders have been
killed by the terrorists.6 We have produced the proof of our political courage and have shown
that we are an organization with solid political convictions different from those defended by
the FIS. We remain the oldest Islamist organization in Algeria.”7 According to this view, the
strategy of the FIS is limited to “terrorism” and the MSP-Hamas strategy is presented as the
alternative. This alternative is based on a rejection of violence and willingness to participate
in state institutions, as explained by another MSP-Hamas leader: “We are against the strategy
of the empty chair. The state is the state for all Algerians, that is why we defend the principle
of participation in state institutions. The Arabic term moucharaka means participation but
also implies collaboration and cooperation. We participate in the government while keeping
                                                 
6 The president of the association Irshad wa Islah was kidnapped on November 25, 1993 and on January 30,
1994 his body was found burried in El Affroun. A militant of the MSp-Hamas, Omar Khennouche, was killed on
March 7, 1994. The chief of the Skikda executive bureau of the MSP-Hamas, Ali Laïb, was killed on September
17, 1994. The vice president of the association Irshad wa Islah and director of the newspaper El Irshad, Lahcene
Bensaadallah, was killed on October 12, 1994. A leader of the MSP-Hamas, Mouloud Bezzaz, was killed on
January 25, 1996. A militant of the MSP-Hamas, candidate in the local elections of October 1997 was killed in
the city of Constantine on October 8, 1997. On October 19, 1997 during a shooting incident at the mosque of
Magrane in the wilaya of El Oued, 4 MSP-Hamas militants were killed, one of whom was a candidate in the
local elections of October 1997. This information was gathered in Algérie-information-Revue de presse from
1992 to 1998.
7 Interview in Algiers with the MSP-Hamas leader n°1, on July 16, 2001. The choice of numbers was made to
keep the name of interviewees anonymous. The different interviewees are numbered 1,2,3,4, and 5.
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our oppositional stand. We participate in the government of the Algerian state but not in the
military regime. We oppose the military regime and say that it is time for the alternation of
power.”8 In his view, collaboration with the regime does not preclude opposition to it. MSP-
Hamas defines itself as an opposition party that seeks access to power. This begs the question
of what the party’s elite expects from its participation in state institutions and how such
participation would enable it to gain power.
First and foremost, the participation of MSP-Hamas leaders in diverse political dialogues
and institutions organized by the military incumbents since their coup in 1992 has provided a
great advertising campaign for their party. One of its leaders confirms this idea: “Hamas
advocates the principle of participation as a way out of the Algerian crisis because no single
force can help Algeria to overcome the crisis. It is this principle of participation that led us to
participate in the CNT in 1994 and in the National Conferences that prepared the electoral
process initiated in 1995 with the presidential elections. This process was an alternative
project to the National Contract signed at Sant’Egidio. Above all, the free elections of June
1995 were a way for the party to get known all around the country.”9 To understand this fact,
it is important to recall that MSP-Hamas’ score at the first plural legislative elections held in
December 1991 was very low (see Table 3 below) compared to its Islamist competitor, the
FIS. Participating in the first elections since the military coup (the 1995 presidential elections)
and as the only Islamist participant (the FIS being outlawed), gave MSP leaders in general,
and Mahfoud Nahnah in particular, direct access to media outlets, such as TV and radio, that
were controlled by the military authorities. Therefore, while the military incumbents were
expecting to use the participation of MSP-Hamas in order to appease part of the FIS
electorate, MSP-Hamas leaders were expecting to gain a public audience and political
importance.
Furthermore, by taking over state functions, even with marginal power, it appears that
MSP-Hamas leaders were hoping to start learning how to govern the state. This conception
was defended by several leaders of this party in the following terms: “The strategy of staying
out of the governance of the country is not fruitful. By participating in the government and
diverse State institutions, we are learning how to govern a country. Participation allows us to
                                                 
8 Interview in Algiers with the MSP-Hamas leader n°4, on July 9, 2001.
9 Interview in Algiers with the MSP-Hamas leader n°2, on July 9, 2001.
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learn governance, it allows us to benefit from this apprentissage of governance that is
essential to a political elite.”10
The notion of educating an elite is also present at lower levels of the party. An MSP-
Hamas national leader explains: “Our militants are organized in groups that we call ousra
(family). This term has been chosen as it refers to both intimacy and brotherhood. We have
organized diverse programs of education for our militants. This teaching is essential; it gives
common political ideas to our militants around the territory. In this way, a militant coming
either from the city of Algiers or Oran will defend the same ideas.”11 One militant of the city
of Oran describes her experience in the MSP-Hamas in the following terms: “It is at the
university that I came to know the Hamas. This was between 1991 and 1994. During this
period, I was questioning myself about the nature of this party: are they democrats? How do
they conceive the role of women in society? I couldn’t answer these questions right away. It
took me some time before I got integrated in the party in 1994. Now, I am learning a lot with
my work in the Hamas. Of course, it is impossible to be a hundred percent satisfied. Militants
are different and I partly disagree with many of them. However, I have to admit that my
militancy in the Hamas helps me shape my political and human experience. What I
particularly appreciate about this party is its education program. We have a meeting each
week in which we debate on a book dealing with political or social issues. Each militant has
the obligation to read a book each week even if he is not a university student. Everybody has
to participate in the discussion about a book every week.”12
Another advantage of participation that MSP-Hamas leaders emphasize is the
socialization of political leaders. One MSP-Hamas leader described this in the following
terms: “Before the opening of the political system in 1989, the diverse political clans didn’t
know one another and were evolving in isolation. After 1989, each political tendency
developed a strongly aggressive pattern of behavior towards the others. All our party
initiatives trying to build a dialogue with the other parties were in vain and this was largely
because of passionate parties such as the FIS. After 1995, the National Popular Assembly
gave the leaders of political parties a real opportunity to be in direct contact with each other.
In the beginning, contacts in the APN were quite difficult. We had to overcome passionate
behavior of some deputies, especially from deputies of the RND (National Democratic Rally),
                                                 
10 Interview in Algiers with the MSP-Hamas leader n°1, on July 16, 2001.
11 Interview in Algiers with the MSP-Hamas leader n°3, on July 10, 2001.
12 Interview in Algiers with the militant MSP-Hamas n°5, on July 9, 2001.
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EnNahda, and the RCD (Rally for Culture and Democracy). Despite these difficulties, mutual
comprehension has started to emerge. Let me tell you an anecdote to illustrate this idea: in the
APN, a friendship was born between the former chief of our parliamentary group, Amar
Ghoul, and an RCD deputy who became minister of health, Amara Benyounes. Once Amara
Benyounes said, joking with other deputies, that he was shaking out of fear for his friend
Amar Ghoul each time that a deputy of his own party, Khalida Messaoudi, known for her
scathing diatribe, began to speak in the Assembly … Another proof of a real improvement in
the cooperation between parties is demonstrated by the participation of two drastically
opposed parties, i.e. the Hamas and the RCD, in the same governmental coalition. This
collaboration is a way of stabilizing our political system.”13
Similarly, a second leader had the following to say: “In Algeria, there is the problem of
political culture. We are still in the process of learning democracy. I remember the first
session at the APN on June 15, 1997. Deputees didn’t know each other, and they were
intimidated by one another. Everybody was talking in a diplomatic way using arabia l’fousha
(modern Arabic) instead of using l’derdja (Algerian Arabic). As time passed, we learned to
know each other. We discovered that some of our ideas converged with those of parties that
we had assumed to be completely opposite to Hamas. This does not exclude some major
differences and quite lively debates at the assembly. For instance, after the widespread
electoral fraud during the local elections of October 1997, the debate was so intense that we
almost insulted RND deputies. Another recent example is the virulent debate about the new
penal code including restricting the liberty of the media. This developped into a major fight
against deputies from the RND and the FLN in the Assembly. Despite these sharp differences,
we respect all the other deputies and some have even become friends.”14
According to these descriptions, this aspect of socialization was one that the MSP-Hamas
elite was not expecting right at the beginning. Rather, it emerged gradually as they began to
exercise their functions in diverse state institutions.
Finally, MSP-Hamas leaders believe they have, to some degree, gained the trust of the
military incumbents. According to one leader, the aggressive behavior of the authorities
towards the party has diminished: “Before our emergence in State institutions, people in the
circles of Power didn’t know the MSP-Hamas elite. Our participation has been fruitful
because they have learned to know us and the aggressive behavior of the Power towards our
                                                 
13 Interview in Algiers with the MSP-Hamas leader n°1, on July 16, 2001.
14 Interview in Algiers with the MSP-Hamas leader n°3, on July 10, 2001
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militants has drastically diminished. Moreover, one can hardly do anything by remaining
outside state institutions. Take the example of the FFS party (Socialist Forces Front). It is the
oldest opposition party in Algeria. Its leaders have always refused any kind of compromise
with the Power or participation in state institutions. We can see today that they haven’t been
able to have an impact on the political situation . Worse, the aggressive behavior of the Power
against the FFS has been as important as that against the FIS since 1992”15 By gaining the
trust of military incumbents, the MSP-Hamas leaders gained a certain degree of freedom.
Although this liberty is still controlled and delimited by the military incumbents, MSP-Hamas
leaders intend to use this margin of maneuver to reinforce the presence of their party both in
society and in state institutions.
To conclude, MSP-Hamas leaders have collaborated with the military incumbents since
the military coup of 1992 and have accepted their own co-optation into various state
institutions. Aware of the limits of their co-optation in terms of power sharing, they were
rather expecting from this moucharaka strategy both the political emergence of their party
and an education in the art of state governance for the elite of the party. Moreover, the
advantages for them of this participation strategy were maximized through the socialization of
the political class at large and by taking advantage of the trust bestowed on them by the
military incumbents. All these aspects are depicted as positive aspects for the reinforcement
of the party as if the eventuality of access to power was not only probable but also imminent.
Yet, if the participation strategy is explained as a way to reinforce the party in different ways,
MSP-Hamas leaders remain elusive when asked about the next logical step of their reasoning,
which can only be some kind of access to power. It is as if their participation strategy had
allowed them to go only half the way towards power. Why could the MSP-Hamas elite not
take advantage of its legalized and protected status to reinforce their party to the extent of
challenging the authoritarian incumbents? Is it due to the failure of this elite in implementing
its strategy? Or is the answer rather to be found in the very mechanisms of co-optation? The
challenge is to understand why, despite their expectations, MSP-Hamas leaders seem to have
come to a deadlock, and it is the task of the next section to address this question.
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III. The mechanisms of co-optation of MSP-Hamas elite
In order to understand the deadlock reached by the MSP-Hamas it is necessary to go
beyond actors’ expectations and analyze the mechanism of the co-optation process. It is safe
to assume that authoritarian regimes’ collapse occurs either under pressure from below, or
after a sharp division among authoritarian incumbents, that is pressures from the top, or even
by a complex combination of both as described by the transitology literature.16 It follows that
in order to challenge the authoritarian incumbents, any opposition has two options at hands:
mass mobilization or the support of a faction of authoritarian incumbents. Explaining the
deadlock reached by the MSP-Hamas  is thus tantamount to explaining why this opposition
was not able to find support neither from below nor from the top. In other words, it is the
conditions of a successful cooptation that does not undermine the authoritarian regime
survival that I seek to identify in this section.
III.1. The impossible mass mobilization and the over-valuation of a minority
group.
According to Linz, limited and not responsible pluralism maintained by a constant process
of co-optation of leaders is one of the characteristics of authoritarian regimes (Linz 1970:
257). The co-opted leaders form a semi-opposition that he defines as “those groups that are
not dominant or represented in the governing group but are willing to participate in power
without fundamentally challenging the regime” (Linz 1973: 191). His description of
semiopposition groups in Spain fits our case of MSP-Hamas elite in Algeria remarkably well:
Many semi-opponents claim to question the basic assumptions of the regime, to search for a way out of
it, and/or to advocate basic social and economic changes, but in fact they do little or nothing of this
kind. The fact that co-optation, rewards, and minors sanctions by those in power prevent any activity to
achieve their professed goals leads me to speak sometimes of pseudo-opposition (Linz 1973: 191).
For this author the status of the semi-opposition is ambiguous. This ambiguous status of
being partly “in” and partly “out” the system, makes it difficult for such a group to be credible
as an effective opposition proposing an alternative to the authoritarian regime. While
participating in power in the hope of reinforcing itself, its very cooperation by the regime
discredits its oppositional stand. In other words, after having accepted to act in collusion with
the incumbents and by implicitly sustaining the authoritarian regime, the pseudo-opposition is
                                                 
16 According to this literature, a transition from authoritarian rule occurs when the opposition finds the right
proportion of support both from the “soft-liners” in the incumbents elite, and from mass mobilization through the
“resurgence of civil society” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
16
unable to present itself as a credible alternative to the regime. Thus, these groups become
what Linz considers as one of the pillars of the authoritarian regime, allowing it to function as
a kind of permanent coalition between different tolerated groups. Instead of opposing the
regime, part of the weak opposition agrees to cooperate with it. It thus becomes a semi-
opposition which paradoxically plays the double role of supporting the regime (Zartman
1990: 220-246), by increasing its responsiveness, and sharing with it the responsibilities of
unpopular policies. In other words, by making the authoritarian regime more flexible, the
semi-opposition allows the authoritarian regime to survive, albeit in another form.
Linz’s conceptualization of the ambiguity of the semi-opposition in an authoritarian
regime fits well with the case of the emergence of the MSP-Hamas elite in Algeria. Yet his
explanation of the emergence and the role of a semi-opposition in an authoritarian regime is
somehow tautological. According to his view, an opposition group discredits itself by
participating in power and thereby becoming no more than a semi-opposition. It can thus no
longer present itself as an alternative to the regime and is no longer able to challenge the
authoritarian power. According to such a view, the very co-optation of the opposition will
explain its inability to challenge the authoritarian regime. If this assumption is correct, there
remains the question of why an opposition group agrees to be co-opted. There are two
possible answers to this question: either the opposition group is of an opportunist character,
that is more interested in the limited and short-term advantages of state functions than to
oppose the regime, or its weakness leads the group to choose collaboration instead of costly
illegal opposition. Although Linz does not give a clear answer to this question in his writings,
the fact that he affirms that a semi-opposition is discredited by its participation in official
power structures automatically implies that it had some form of credit as an opposition to the
regime before that. Therefore, Linz’s reasoning leads to the following tautology: a “credible”
opposition group opts for the strategy of participation in power via co-optation because it is
too weak to oppose the regime directly, but once it participates it becomes discredited as an
opposition, which in turn further weakens its capacity to oppose the regime. According to this
line of thought, the weakness of the opposition is both the causal factor and the consequence
of participation in power.
My own view is that the weakness and over-valuation of an opposition group are two
conditions for the co-optation process to occur. Indicators of the weakness of an opposition
group are its low electoral scores and its low mobilization capacity. The only reliable data on
electoral scores are the results of the first round of parliamentary elections of December 1991.
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Table 3 shows that the results for MSP-Hamas were particularly poor, while its Islamist rival,
the FIS, gathered an overwhelming majority of votes. As to the mobilizational capacity of the
party, this remains unclear, in part due to the party’s refusal to disclose the number of its
militants. However, MSP-Hamas has never organized a peaceful street demonstration as
many other political parties have done in Algeria. Asked about this aspect one MSP-Hamas
leader gave the following answer: “The number of our militants is confidential information
that we do not disclose. Yet you can assess our mobilizational capacity through the high
participation by the population at all our political meetings. When we organize meetings at
the Ibn Khaldoun and Harcha halls in Algiers that have a capacity of 200 to 300 persons, the
halls are always full. And this is true for all meetings we organize around the country.”17 Such
an affirmation is highly questionable. Indeed, how could one compare hundreds of citizens in
a meeting hall to millions of voters and thousands of sympathizers in the street? It appears
from such information that the mobilizational capacity of the MSP-Hamas is either weak or
well hidden.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom about co-optation, authoritarian incumbents do not
co-opt and share power with strong opposition groups that threaten their power. Rather, they
repress threatening groups while at the same time co-opting their weak competitors. This
process of co-optation goes hand in hand with a process of over-valuation of the co-opted
group, which aims at giving the illusion that this group is strong in the sense that electors and
a relatively high number of militants support it. In this way, incumbents can pretend to have
made a concession to the opposition and even to share power with it, in the hope that this will
temper popular support for opposition groups.
 In the case of Algeria, the military incumbents have repressed the strong political
opposition of the Islamist party FIS while co-opting minority Islamist groups such as the
MSP-Hamas and, to a lesser extent, the EnNahda party. Unfair elections have been the mode
of valorization and co-optation of this group. Unlike the legislative elections of 1991, all
elections since 1995 have not only been tainted by widespread fraud but have also been
organized under the close protection of the army. Tables 3 allows for a comparison between
the one free election in 1991 and unfair elections, such as the presidential elections of 1995,
the legislative elections of June 1997, and the local elections of October 1997. The vote for
MSP-Hamas, according to these official figures increased from almost 370.000 votes in 1991
(about 5% of those who voted) to almost 3 millions votes in the presidential elections of 1995
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(approximately 26% of those who voted), and more than one million and a half votes in the
legislative elections of 1997 (corresponding to about 14% of those who voted). One could
argue that the dramatic increase that occurred between 1991 and the subsequent election is
due to the absence of the FIS in the electoral contests of 1995 and 1997. This argument holds
only to a certain extent, given that the FIS in exile called for a boycott of both elections. It is
nevertheless plausible to argue that the FIS lost part of its electoral base, especially the petty
bourgeoisie, after the violence of the civil war. However, the hypothesis that the majority of
its electorate, including the young masses from the cities, turned out to vote for MSP-Hamas -
as the official voting figures would lead to believe - seems rather unlikely. Instead, it is more
plausible that MSP-Hamas was discredited in the eyes of the public opinion because of its
wishy-washy opposition discourse and its participation in government. It is therefore natural
to conclude that the authoritarian incumbents who control the state bureaucracy have used
electoral fraud as a way of inflating voting figures for MSP-Hamas. This over-valuation aims
at presenting this party as a strong opposition party supported by a majority of former FIS
followers and then including it as such in the governing coalition.
[TABLE 3]
In conclusion, elections and electoral fraud have been a way of co-opting weak opposition
groups, while at the same time repressing more threatening groups. This co-optation process
has run in parallel with a process of over-valuation, which has taken place by inflating the
electoral scores of MSP-Hamas. Yet co-optation into state institutions opens up the possibility
of an alliance between some faction of the military incumbents and the MSP-Hamas taking
over control of the state. One MSP-Hamas leader indirectly suggested this possibility by
saying that the aggressive behavior towards MSP-Hamas militants has almost disappeared
and that circles of the Power even trust the MSP-Hamas elite. Is this scenario possible? In
order to answer this question, we now turn to the issue of the authoritarian incumbents,
namely the Algerian Army.
III.2. The unobtainable support from the top and the authoritarian incumbents’
consensus.
The puzzle regarding civil-military relations can be characterized in the following terms:
how “to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a
military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do” (Feaver 1996:
19
149). In the Algerian case, the challenge would rather be how to displace existing military
incumbents and establish civilian supremacy. Since the independence of Algeria in 1962, the
Algerian Army has been a highly opaque institution which has exercised political power.
Abdelkader Yefsah explains the intrinsic link between the Algerian Army and the state in
terms of the historical conditions of the Liberation War and the first years of independence
(Yefsah 1982, 1993, 1995). According to this author the link dates back to the Liberation War
during which the leadership of the FLN/ALN (the National Liberation Front and its National
Liberation Army) was conducting a war against the French colonizer at the same time as it
was attempting to build a new Algerian state. He shows in great detail how military power
supplanted political power (Yefsah 1993: 77-80). This trend continued after the country’s
independence in 1962 and culminated with Houari Boumediene’s military coup of June 19,
1965. Since then, the Army has had a monopoly over political power. Yet this control has
never been as direct as it is a civilian government that runs the state bureaucracy. Therefore, a
double bureaucracy emerged - civilian and military – with the latter controlling the former
(Yefsah 1993: 84).
Samuel Huntington’s explanation of how to overcome military interference in affairs of
the state is known as the objective civilian control theory (Huntington 1957). According to
Huntington, it is necessary that the civilian authorities recognize the principle of autonomous
military professionalism. The military should be independent, so that civilians cannot attempt
to maximize their power by involving the military in political activity. The key concepts are
autonomy and professionalism. An officer corp that focused on its own profession, and that
was granted sufficient independence to organize itself would be politically neutral.
The Algerian army is not a professional one. Since independence, it has been organized
according to the model of a “popular army” based on conscription. Despite the army
modernization project launched in 1984, few genuine reforms have been implemented18 and
its initial structure remains more or less unaltered. Nevertheless, the Algerian army appears
completely autonomous from civilian control. No civilian institution is capable of exercising
any form of control over the Algerian military. The political scientist Abdelkader Yefsah
argues that “the Army is the only organized structure which is strong enough to control
power” (Yefsah 1993: 77). Whether this statement is objectively true or not cannot be
verified. However, it is striking to note that the army has been able to appear as such to most
                                                 
18 Since 1984, the main changes have been the establishement of new ranks in the military hierarchy, the
reduction of the length of military service, and the reorganization of the secret services.
20
Algerian actors, including the MSP-Hamas elite. This can be observed in the political
discourse of most Algerian political actors, even though discourses of the PT and the FFS
parties provide a partial exception to this rule. All these discourses reveal a great deal of
confusion between the notions of regime, state, and power. The term le Pouvoir (the Power)
is used interchangeably with reference to the Army, the Algerian state and the political
regime. This shows how strong the confusion is between the military institution and the
exercise of power in Algeria.
A good example of such confusion is found in the belief shared by most political actors
that the Army is the only organization capable of preserving Algeria from chaos. Whether this
chaos is embodied by the FIS acceding to power or by the Berber rioters of spring 2001, the
Army is perceived by political actors as the only solution. Interviews with two MSP-Hamas
members illustrate this belief. The first one points out the danger posed by the FIS: “In
Algeria power comes from the hat.19 The opening up of the Algerian political system began
only ten years ago. Democratization is a long process. Look at France, it needed two hundred
years to arrive at democracy. Our problem in Algeria since the political system opened up has
been the FIS. How could we manage to impede the formation of a FIS-like party? The only
thing that I can say is that the answer is to be found with the military because they are the
ones who hold the power.”20 The second member blames the Berber rioters of June 2001:
“Some people like the Berber rioters attack the Algerian army and accuse it of all sorts of
things. Of course some are right in their accusations. Yet we have to ask ourselves if it is in
the interest of Algerian citizens that the military organization may be weakened. What would
happen if we asked the army to “go out and leave power?”  I think that another crisis like
1992 would occur, that is, another serious civil war.”21 In this view, the Army exercises
power because it represents the only organization strong enough and organized enough to
preserve the state from collapse.
The exclusive control by the army of the Algerian state implies that the army has
exclusive control over state revenues, the most important of which is oil revenue. Therefore,
along with the claim to historical legitimacy, state control is also highly lucrative.  This state
of affairs is eloquently described by Lahouari Addi:
The army lays down the major economic guidelines, but the government divides oil revenues
between various ministerial departments, determines the structure of investment, and chooses trading
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20 Interview in Algiers with the MSP-Hamas leader n°3, on July 10, 2001.
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partners in Algeria and abroad. The government thereby legalizes the transfer of some oil revenue to
its network of clients, both military and civilians – an especially important dynamic now that the
economy is moving towards privatization and joint ventures. Still, the government’s composition
reflects the political line of the army, whose various factions nominate their protégés as ministers.
Those appointed have two briefs: to stand up for the general interests of the regime and to show their
loyalty to the faction that appointed them (Addi 1998: 48).
There exist different factions, or clans, within the military institutions which are allied
with civilian clients that share the oil revenue. Little is known about this issue since no
sociological study has been carried out on the Army as an institution and its links to civilian
networks. It follows that what can be said on this question remains pure conjecture. However,
it is worth recalling a few scholarly contributions to the understanding of this issue.
Abdelkader Yefsah argues that army clans were formed according to an ethnic criterion.
He defines the Boumediene presidency as the “colonels” era22 in which the Oujda clan
(western-based officers’ clan) predominated. With the Chadli presidency, an eastern-based
officer clan (the famous BTS, based on the three eastern cities of Batna-Tebessa-Souk Ahras)
got the upper hand in the military institution (Yefsah 1993: 84-85). Since 1992, according to
Lahouari Addi, the civil war has changed the structure of clans within the Algerian army. He
describes three main changes: the relative autonomy of the diverse military branches which
created several centers of power; the rapid ascent of the commander-in-chief of the army,
major-general Lamari, who in turn brought about the third change; and the domination of a
clan based on political rather than ethnic criteria (Addi 1999). Moreover, this author argues
that the locus of decision-making within the army rests with military officers’ conclave:
In time of crisis, the top military brass meets in conclave. It was they who decided to cancel the 1992
elections after the first round gave the lead to the FIS and to nominate instead Liamine Zeroual for the
presidency in November 1995. The general’s informal meetings are not reported in the press –
understandably since the constitution does not provide for them.
The criteria for taking part in these conclaves are unknown. The participants are thought to include
officers from the general staff and the heads of the central services of the defense ministry, the military
districts, the national police, and the domestic security force – in other words, men who have a certain
autonomy in the way they use the forces of law and order. Given the importance of the decisions it
makes, this informal assembly is, in fact, installing itself as a sovereign body. Increasingly, Algeria is
run by a military caste (Addi 1998: 47).
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22 Since the failed coup conducted by the commander-in-chief of army, Tahar Zbiri, in 1967, the rank of
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Verifying the existence of these secret conclaves is, for the time being, impossible.
However, in line with Addi’s description, one can formulate the following reasoning:
(1) Since 1988, the claim of historical legitimacy and the control and distribution of oil
revenue allow the military to claim exclusive control over the state. This exclusive control
has been put in question by strong opposition movements embodied by the FIS at the
beginning of the 1990s and the Berber movement in 2001.
(2) In order to maintain its exclusive control over the state, the army has resorted to the
repression of threatening groups, while at the same time co-opting minority groups such
as the MSP-Hamas. However, such co-optation opens the possibility of a coup conducted
by one military faction in association with the co-opted civilian group that would play the
role of a civilian façade for the new power holders.
(3) Only a strong consensus binding the different military factions could avoid this
possibility. Addi’s speculation on military conclaves suggests that the military officers
may have agreed to keep their hold on power together. However, the temptation for a
faction to cheat is always present. Therefore, there should be a factor binding conclave
participants to honor their common agreement.
That there is a consensus between the different military factions is a plausible hypothesis.
However, the factor binding this consensus remains unknown.
Conclusion
In conclusion, on the basis of a thorough analysis of the recent rise of the MSP-Hamas
party in Algeria, I have identified two conditions for a successful co-optation, that is a co-
optation that does not threaten the authoritarian incumbents’ hold on power in the short term.
The first condition resides in the co-optation of an opposition weak in terms of its
mobilizational capacity, and its over-valuation via electoral fraud. This insight leads to a new
interpretation of the function of the elections in authoritarian regimes (Hermet and al. 1978).
In the case of Algeria, elections can hardly be interpreted as a competition for electors’ votes.
The competition takes place at another level, and consists in searching for military
incumbents’ trust. Elections, characterized by widespread fraud, shall rather be interpreted as
co-option mechanisms a new elite.
The second condition for a non-threatening co-optation is found in the binding consensus
of authoritarian incumbents. This conclusion is consistent with the hypothesis of the elite-
based transition literature according to which the divide between hard and soft-liners is at the
origin of the beginning of transition from authoritarian rule (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986:
23
15-17). This process of co-optation excludes any possibility of an opening in the political
system. It is through these mechanisms that the Algerian authoritarian regime has endured in
the past few years.
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T a b le  1 .  M S P - H a m a s  m in i s t e r s  i n  t h e  s u c c e s s iv e  c a b i n e t s  s i n c e  1 9 9 2
In  S e c o n d  G h o z a l i  C a b i n e t  ( F e b r u a r y  2 2 ,  1 9 9 2  to  J u n e  2 9 ,  1 9 9 2 )  a n d  th e  A b d e s s a l e m  C a b i n e t  ( J u l y
1 9 th  1 9 9 2  to  A u g u s t  2 1 ,  1 9 9 3 )  a  m e m b e r  o f  th e  a s s o c ia t i o nI r s h a d  w a l  I s la h i s  n o m i n a t e d  m in i s t e r :
 S a s s i  L a m o u r i ,  m i n i s t e r  o f  R e l i g i o u s  a f f a i r s .
I n  t h e  M a le k  C a b i n e t  ( S e p t e m b e r  4 ,  1 9 9 3  t o  A p r i l  1 1 ,  1 9 9 4 )  H a m a s  h a s  n o  p o r t f o l i o s
In  t h e  S i f i  C a b i n e t  ( A p r i l  1 1 ,  1 9 9 4  to  D e c e m b e r  3 1 ,  1 9 9 5 )  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  a s s o c ia t io n I r s h a d  w a l
I s la h  i s  n o m in a t e d  m i n i s t e r :
 S a s s i  L a m o u r i ,  m i n i s t e r  o f  R e l i g i o u s  a f f a i r s .
I n  t h e  f i r s t  O u y a h ia  C a b i n e t  ( J a n u a r y  5 ,  1 9 9 6  to  J u n e  1 0 , 1 9 9 7 ) ,  H a m a s  h a s  t w o  p o r tf o l i o s  o u t  o f  3 1 :
  A b d e l k a d e r  H a m i t o u ,  m i n i s t e r  o f  P M E -P M I  ( s m a l l  a n d  m e d i u m  f i r m s  a n d  i n d u s t r i e s )
 B o u g u e r r a  S o l ta n i ,  s e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta t e  in  c h a r g e  o f  f i s h e r y .
In  t h e  s e c o n d  O u y a h ia  C a b in e t  ( 2 4 ,o f  J u n e  1 9 9 7  t o  1 5 ,  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 8 )  a n d  t h e  H a m d a n i  C a b in e t  ( 1 5 ,
D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 8  to  2 3 ,  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 9 ) ,  H a m a s  k e e p s  t h e  s a m e  s e v e n  p o r t f o l io s  o u t  o f  3 9 ::
 A b d e l m a d j i d  M e n a s r a ,  m i n i s t e r  o f  In d u s t r y  a n d  R e s t r u c t u r a t io n
 B o u g u e r r a  S o l ta n i ,  m i n i s te r  o f  P M E -P M I  ( s m a l l  a n d  m e d i u m  f i r m s  a n d  i n d u s tr i e s )
 A b d e l k a d e r  B e n g r in a ,  m in i s t e r  o f  T o u r i s m  a n d  C r a f t s m e n
 S i d  A h m e d  B o u l i l ,  m i n i s t e r  o f  T r a n s p o r t s
 M o h a m e d  N o u r a ,  s e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  i n  c h a r g e  o f  C r a f t s m e n
 A b d e l k a d e r  H a m i t o u ,  s e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  i n  c h a r g e  o f  f i s h e r y  ( r e m o v e d  f r o m  o f f i c e  o n  A p r i l  1 9 th
1 9 9 9 )
 B a c h i r  A m r a t ,  s e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  i n  c h a r g e  o f  e n v i ro n m e n t .
In  t h e  B e n b i to u r  C a b i n e t  ( D e c e m b e r  2 3 ,  1 9 9 9  t o  A u g u s t  2 6 ,  2 0 0 0 ) ,  H a m a s  h a s  th r e e  p o r t f o l io s  o u t  o f
3 3 :
 A b d e l m a d j i d  M e n a s r a ,  m i n i s t e r  o f  In d u s t r y  a n d  R e s t r u c t u r a t io n
 B o u g u e r r a  S o l ta n i ,  m i n i s te r  o f  L a b o r  a n d  S o c i a l  p ro te c t io n
  G h o u l  A m a r ,  m i n i s t e r  o f  F i s h e r y
In  t h e  B e n f l i s  C a b in e t  ( f ro m  A u g u s t  2 6 ,2 0 0 0  u p  to  n o w ) ,  H a m a s  h a s  th r e e  p o r tf o l i o s  o u t  o f  3 5
 A b d e l m a d j i d  M e n a s r a ,  m i n i s t e r  o f  In d u s t r y  a n d  R e s t r u c t u r a t io n
 B o u g u e r r a  S o l ta n i ,  m i n i s te r  o f  L a b o r  a n d  S o c i a l  p ro te c t io n  ( r e m o v e d  f r o m  o f f i c e  o n  2 0 0 1 ) .
 G h o u l  A m a r ,  m i n i s t e r  o f  F i s h e r y
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 S o u rc e s : T a b le  c re a te d  o n  th e  b a s is  o f  th e  P ro c la m a tio n  o f 3 0  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 1  " p o rta n t  ré su lta ts  o ff ic ie ls  d e s  
é le c tio n s  lé g is la t iv e s  d u  2 6  d é c e m b re  1 9 9 1  (1 e r to u r) ."  J O R A  n ° 0 1  o f  4  J a n u a ry  1 9 9 2 , p 2 -3 ;  th e  lis t  o f  C N T  
n o m in a te d  m e m b e rs  p u b lish e d  in  L e  M a tin  o f 1 8 th  M a y  1 9 9 4 ;  th e  P ro c la m a tio n  n ° 0 1 -9 7  P -C C  o f 9  J u n e  1 9 9 7  
" re la tiv e  a u x  ré su lta ts  d e  l ’é le c t io n  d e s  m e m b re s  d e  l ’A sse m b lé e  p o p u la ire  n a tio n a le ."  J O R A  n °4 0  o f  1 1  J u n e  
1 9 9 7 ,  p 3 -2 1 ;  th e  N a tio n  C o u n c il e le c tio n s  re su lts  p u b lish e d  in  A lg é r ie -In fo rm a tio n s  R e v u e  d e  p re sse  o f  
D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 7 ;  L e  Q u o tid ie n  d ’O ra n  o f  2 n d J a n u a ry  2 0 0 1 ; a n d  th e  1 9 9 7  lo c a l e le c t io n  re su lts  p u b lish e d  in
A lg é r ie  In fo rm a tio n s  –  R e v u e  d e  P re sse  o f  O c to b e r  1 9 9 7 . 
N o te s :  
1 . 1 9 9 1  A ss e m b ly : th e  s e c o n d  ro u n d  o f  th e  le g is la tiv e  e le c tio n s  w a s  c a n c e lle d  o n  J a n u a ry  1 9 9 2 . C o n se q u e n tly ,
th is  a s s e m b ly  n e v e r  c o n v e n e d .  D e s p ite  th is  fa c t,  th e s e  n u m b e rs  o ffe r  a  g o o d  m e a su re  o f  c o m p a r iso n  b e c a u se
it w a s  th e  fi rs t  t im e  H a m a s  p a r tic ip a te d   in  e le c tio n s .  
2 . 1 9 9 4  N a tio n a l T ra n s it io n  C o u n c il :  th is  C o u n c il  is  a  le g is la tiv e  a s se m b ly  th a t  w a s  e s ta b lis h e d  a s  p a r t o f  th e
so -c a lle d  “ in s t itu tio n  o f  tr a n s itio n ”  a f te r  th e  1 9 9 2  m il ita ry  c o u p , b y  p re s id e n tia l d e c re e  in  J u n e  1 9 9 4  (D é c re t
p ré s id e n t ie l  p o r ta n t in v e s titu re  d e s  m e m b re s  d u  C o n se il n a t io n a l d e  t ra n s it io n . J O R A  n ° 4 0  d u  2 2  ju in  1 9 9 4 ,
p 4 ) . I t  is  c o m p o s e d  o f  2 0 0  m e m b e rs  n o m in a te d  b y  th e  s ta te , p o litic a l p a r tie s , a n d  a s so c ia t io n s .  
3 . T h e  N a tio n  C o u n c i l:  th e  1 9 9 6  C o n s ti tu tio n  e s ta b lish e d  fo r  th e  f ir s t t im e  in  A lg e r ia n  c o n s ti tu tio n a l h is to ry  a n
u p p e r  c h a m b e r , th e  N a tio n  C o u n c il.  T w o  th ird  o f th e  1 4 4  se n a to r s  o f th is  c h a m b e r , th a t is  9 6 , a re  e le c te d  b y  
in d ire c t  su ffra g e  a n d  o n e  th ird , th a t is  4 8 , a re  n o m in a te d  b y  th e  P re s id e n t. T h e  E n a c tm e n t  n °9 7 -0 7  (o f  6  
M a rc h  1 9 9 7  " p o r ta n t lo i o rg a n iq u e  re la tiv e  a u  ré g im e  é le c to ra l."  J O R A  n °1 2  d u  6  M a rc h  1 9 9 7 , p 3 -2 2 . 
C o r r ig e n d u m  J O R A  n °2 6  d u  3 8  A p r il 1 9 9 7 , p 6 )  s ta te s  in  i ts  a r tic le s  1 2 2  to  1 5 2  th a t se n a to rs  a re  e le c te d  fo r
s ix  y e a rs  a c c o rd in g  to  “ f ir s t p a s t th e  p o s t”  sy s te m  a t th e  w ila y a le v e l (d e p a r tm e n ta l le v e l) .  T h e  m a n d a te  o f  
h a lf th e  C o u n c i l m e m b e rs  is  r e n e w e d  e v e ry  th re e  y e a rs . T h e  E le c to ra l C o lle g e  is  c o m p o s e d  o f  1 5 .0 0 3  A P C  
a n d  A P W  m e m b e rs . 




Results of 1991 legislative 
elections 
(only first round) 
Results of 1995 
presidential elections 
Results of 1997 legislative  
elections 
Results of 1997 local 
elections (APC) 



















































 Sources: Tab le created  on the basis of the P roclam ation of 30 D ecem ber 1991  "portan t résultats officiels des élections
législatives du  26 décem bre 1991  (1 er tour)." JO RA  n°01 of 4  January 1992 , p2-3 ; the 1995 presiden tial elections resu lts 
pub lished  in  A lgérie  In form ations –  R evue de P resse of N ovem ber 1995; the P roclam ation n°01-97  P -C C  of 9  June 1997  
"relative aux résu ltats de l’élection des m em bres de l’A ssem blée populaire nationale." JO R A  n°40  of 11 June 1997, p3-21 ; 
and  the 1997 local election  resu lts pub lished in  A lgérie  In form ations –  R evue de P resse o f O ctober 1997 . 
N otes:  
 1991: law  n°91-17  of 15  O ctober 1991 "m odifian t et com plétan t la loi n°89-13  du  7  aoû t 1989  portan t loi électorale." 
JO R A  n°48  of 16  O ctober 1991 , p1542-1547 . The article  84  o f this law  states: M P s are elected  accord ing to  a m ajority 
electoral system  w ith  tw o  ballots. P articipation  in  the 1991  legislative elections w as 58 ,55 % . 
 1995: law  n°89-13 of 7  A ugust 1989  "portant loi é lecto rale" states that the P residen t is elected  w ith  a m ajority electoral 
system  w ith  tw o ballo ts. P articipation  in  the 1995  presiden tial elections w as 72,76% . 
 1997: Enactm ent n°97-07  of 6  M arch  1997  "portan t lo i o rgan ique relative au régim e électo ral." JO R A  n°12  of 6  M arch  
1997 , p3-22. C orrigendum  JO RA  n°26  of 38  A pril 1997 , p6 . C oncerning the P opular N ational A ssem bly, the articles 
101  to  121  of this law  state: M P s are elected  for five years by a proportional electo ral list system . P articipation  in  the
1997  legislative elections w as 65 ,60  % . 
 1997  : Enactm ent n°97-07  of 6  M arch  1997  "portan t lo i organique relative au  régim e électo ral." JO R A  n°12  of 6  M arch  
1997 , p3-22 . C orrigendum  JO R A  n°26  of 38  A pril 1997 , p6. C oncerning the A P C  (P opular C om m unal A ssem bly) and
A P W  (P opular W ilayal A ssem bly) the articles 75  to  100 of th is law  state: The m em bers are elected fo r five years by a
proportional electo ral list system . The global participation  fo r both  A P C  and  A P W  elections w as 65,21  % . 
